Relative age effects in political selection by Tukiainen, Janne et al.
 
 
Janne Tukiainen, Tuomas Takalo and Topi Hulkkonen  
Relative age effects in political selection 
 






Tukiainen, Janne and Takalo, Tuomas and Hulkkonen, Topi (2018) Relative age effects in 
political selection. European Journal of Political Economy. ISSN 0176-2680 
 
© 2018 Elsevier 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90502/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 





Relative Age Effects in Political Selection* 
 
Janne Tukiainen 
London School of Economics and Political Science and 
VATT Institute for Economic Research 
 
Tuomas Takalo 
Bank of Finland and VATT Institute for Economic Research 
 
Topi Hulkkonen 
StatFinn Ltd and University of Helsinki 
 
October 11, 2018 
 
Abstract 
We exploit a regression discontinuity design to provide causal evidence of the relative age 
effect (RAE) on a long-run adult age outcome: Political selection. We find strong evidence of 
the RAE in politics in Finland. However, the effect is heterogeneous: We find that male 
candidates born early in the calendar year have a significantly higher probability of getting 
elected to the parliament but no similar RAE applies to female candidates nor to municipal 
elections. Moreover, this effect only takes place in the most competitive parliamentary 
districts and is present only for some parties. We also find that in all the groups where the 
RAE does not exist, early-born candidates are under-represented suggesting attrition of talent 
in the candidate placement. Overall, our results show that seemingly artificial cutoffs imposed 
by the government have persistent consequences even on the selection to the highest positions 
of power within a society.  
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1. Introduction 
The relative age effect (RAE) refers to the possible advantage that children get when 
being relatively old in their cohort, that is, children born early in the calendar year perform 
better that those born later. The existence of an RAE in various professional sports and 
educational performance is well documented (see, e.g., Musch and Grondin, 2001, Bedard 
and Duhey, 2006, Böheim and Lackner, 2012, Fredriksson and Öckert, 2014, and Fumarco 
and Rossi, 2018). The academic and policy interest here arises for four primary reasons. First, 
there is a concern that artificial rules imposed by the society may create persistent inequality 
and, second, result in losing irreversibly potential talent among the relatively young in many 
areas of human life. Third, the existence of an RAE should make a difference for decisions 
that parents take in family planning and raising children. For example, parents may be making 
uniformed decisions in enrolling their children to school earlier than obligatory or in waiving 
the possibility of seeking over-age permissions when warranted. Finally, understanding the 
mechanisms behind RAE offers a window into understanding early-life human capital 
accumulation.  
Despite the extent of empirical analysis of the RAE, it has remained a possibility that 
the RAE could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity, for example, season of birth effects 
due to, e.g., biological, climatic, or environmental factors (Musch and Grondin, 2001). Nor it 
is clear to what extent the RAE exists beyond education and sports, and to what extent the 
RAE prevails in the long-run outcomes. Furthermore, the literature has largely focused on 
estimating the average RAE, paying much less attention to potential heterogeneity in the 
RAE. For example, there may be important gender differences in the prevalence of an RAE is 
sports (e.g., Helsen et al., 2005, Vincent and Glamser, 2006, and Nakata and Sakamoto, 
2012), but it is not clear whether such gender differences in the RAE exist in other areas of 
human life. Similarly, a competitive environment has been understood to be a key ingredient 
 3
for the emergence of an RAE in sports (see, e.g., Musch and Grondin, 2001, and Addona and 
Yates, 2010) but it is not clear whether this insight carries elsewhere. Finally, there is not 
much rigorous evidence to evaluate the hypothesis (put forward by Musch and Grondin, 
2001) that explains the gender differences in the RAE only by the differences in the depth of 
competition across female and male team sports.  
In this paper, we provide evidence from the Finnish politics of an RAE on long-run 
political outcomes and show that the RAE in politics is not caused by unobserved 
heterogeneity, but rather by the factors that give a performance advantage to those of the 
oldest of a cohort. More specifically, the closer is the exact date of the birth of a January-born 
candidate to the New Year, the larger is his probability to become elected in parliamentary 
elections. We also find strong evidence that the RAE only applies to males in competitive 
political environments. In particular, we find no evidence of the RAE among female 
politicians nor in local municipal elections where competition is much weaker that on the 
nation-wide parliamentary elections, or even in those parliamentary districts that are less 
competitive. Moreover, no RAE appears to be present among the politicians of the Centre 
Party, one of the three main parties in Finland, which is known for its centralized candidate 
selection process. 
Our results on candidate selection show that in all the groups where the RAE does not 
exist, early-born candidates are under-represented compared to late-born candidates. In 
contrast, in groups where we find the RAE, the density of candidates develops smoothly over 
the end-of-the-year cutoff. This suggests that the attrition of (early-born) talent in the 
candidate placement in some groups it at least one possible reason for the lack of the RAE. 
Politics in Finland provides a useful environment to study both gender- and 
competition-specific RAEs. Finland was the first country in Europe to introduce women’s 
suffrage in 1907 and female representation in politics has been since then high by 
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international standards. For example, in 2015 parliamentary elections, roughly 40% of 
candidates and successfully elected candidates were female. Moreover, we use data on 
parliamentary elections from a period where there still were substantial differences in the 
level of political competition between parliamentary districts.  
Our comparative evidence from the Finnish politicians supports Muller and Page’s 
(2015) seminal findings of the existence of an RAE in the US congress (another highly 
competitive environment). Going beyond Muller and Page (2015), we find that gender, the 
intensity of electoral competition, and party differences matter for the emergence of an RAE 
in political selection. Our results suggest that those males who have benefited from RAEs 
during early-life in school seem to perform better, and thus, political selection in Finland is at 
least to some extent meritocratic. Therefore, we contribute to understanding political selection 
(see, e.g., Caselli and Morelli, 2004, and Poutvaara and Takalo, 2007, for theoretical 
foundations, and Galasso and Nannicini, 2011, Kotakorpi and Poutvaara, 2011, Brollo et al., 
2013, Folke et al., 2016, and Dal Bó et al., 2017 among others for empirical evidence). On the 
other hand, our result has a less encouraging implication: We seem to be losing irreversibly 
potential talent among the late born in the political arena due to the artificial division of 
children into different age groups.    
A standard economics explanation for why the RAE emerges more prominently in 
competitive environments is that the RAE enhances performance and competition is needed to 
screen out better performing types, similarly as competition in the marketplace weeds out 
worse performing firms. This explanation is consistent with previous literature arguing that 
political competition correlates with improved politician quality (e.g., De Paola and Scoppa 
2011, and Galasso and Nannicini 2011). According to psychology literature, a gender gap in 
the RAE might arise, for example, because boys and girls on average differ in their coping 
strategies and emotional response to various environmental factors (Aune et al. 2018, 
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Eschenbeck et al. 2007, and Chaplin and Aldao, 2013). Thus, there possibly could be 
heterogeneity in the RAE also on the development of boys and girls when it comes to traits 
that are valuable in the political arena. Taken together, these two features would explain why 
the RAE could emerge only for males in competitive political environment. Given the high 
share of women in the Finnish politics, however, our results fit less well with the hypothesis 
that gender-specific differences in the depth of competition would lead to the gender gap in 
the RAE. 
Also a more complicated explanation is consistent with our heterogeneity results: If 
females shy away from mixed-sex competition (see, e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, and 
Niederle et al., 2013) and if the emergence of the RAE is linked to competitive pressure, we 
could observe the RAE more visibly in males in more competitive mix-sex environments such 
as competitive elections. However, for this to be the case, such attrition needs to affect 
talented women disproportionally, for example due to better outside options (see, e.g., Brollo 
et al., 2013). Indeed, we see evidence of such attrition patterns in candidate selection. Thus, 
we provide a new real-life angle to the extensive laboratory literature of gender differences in 
competitiveness (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011, and Niederle, 2016, surveys). This 
hypothesis linking the RAE to the gender-competition nexus, together with the laboratory 
evidence by Niederle et al. (2013) that a quota-style affirmative action might reduce the 
gender gap in competitiveness, predict that encouraging female representation in politics via 
quotas could result in the emergence of the RAE among the female politicians, too.1 
Therefore, while our approach is explorative and there are several possible theoretical 
interpretations for our findings, this argument provides a hypothesis to test in future work. 
Our findings also shed some light on the possible mechanisms underlying the 
emergence of the RAE. In particular, the heterogeneity in the RAE with respect to gender 
                                                 
1 Since gender quotas appear to increase the competence of male politicians in particular (Besley et al., 2017), 
they could also affect the emergence of the RAE among men in politics. 
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supports psychological theories (see, e.g., Musch and Grondin, 2001) as the main mechanism 
for the human capital accumulation caused by the RAE, but fits less well with the resource-
based theories of the RAE. For example, it may be particularly harmful for boys to be 
disadvantaged among peers. As a result, the findings help to design appropriate policy 
response to the RAE.   
In the next section we survey the previous literature documenting the existence of the 
RA, various theories proposed to explain this phenomenon, and motivate why we might to 
expect to see heterogeneity in the RAE. We describe our data and institutional background in 
Section 3. Then, in Section 4, we proceed to our empirical investigation of the RAE among 
the Finnish politicians. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Previous Literature  
2.1 Evidence of the RAE  
There is a large, multidisciplinary literature documenting the existence of an RAE in 
educational performance and sports. There is also some evidence that the effect is causal and 
not driven by season of birth effects. For example, there is cross-country variation in the 
school and youth sport admission cut-off dates which has been exploited in identification 
(e.g., Munch and Hay, 1999, and Bedard and Duhey, 2006). While this evidence is quite 
convincing, there is still possibility that the cut-off date and relative performance variation 
may be partially driven by the same factors. For example, climatic factors partially explain 
school and sport season and cut-off variation around the world (e.g., for historical reasons 
school entry takes place after the harvesting period, i.e., in August-October in the Northern 
Hemisphere, and in March-May in the Southern Hemisphere, and this is reflected in the 
school cut-off dates) and it could still be possible that similar climatic factors (e.g., exposure 
to sun light at a critical development stage) contribute to the relative performance gap.  
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Another straightforward way to provide causal evidence is to exploit variation over time 
in the cut-off dates. For example, since 1980s there has been international effort to harmonize 
cut-off dates for youth football to the 1st of January. Musch and Hay (1999) and Helsen et al. 
(2000) exploit this shift in Australian and Belgian youth soccer cut-off dates, respectively, and 
show that performance advantage of those born early in the previous regime vanishes in the 
new regime whereas those born early in the new regime gain a performance advantage.  
A third way to provide causal evidence on the existence of the RAE is to resort to 
regression discontinuity design (RDD). For example, Barnsley and Thompson (1988), Ponzo 
and Scoppa (2014) and Crawford et al. (2014) provide evidence for the existence of a 
performance gap between those born one month before and one after the cut-off date in ice-
hockey and education. We also perform a RDD where we use data around the cut-off date. 
Unlike the above studies, we optimize our estimation window instead of resorting to arbitrary 
windows and use state-of-the-art inference (Calonico et al., 2014, and 2016a).  
Beyond sports and education, there is relative paucity of studies of the long-run RAE 
that allow for a causal interpretation. Fredrikson and Öckert (2014) and Landersøn et al. 
(2017) use the RDD approach to study the effect of school starting age on long-run labor 
market outcomes and youth crime, respectively. In the only prior study concerning the RAE 
in politics, Muller and Page (2015) document the evidence for the existence of a bias in the 
birth rates for US congress representatives, favoring those where the eldest in their cohort at 
school. We complement their study by using RDD to estimate the gender- and competition-
specific RAE in the Finnish parliamentary and municipal elections.  
 
2.2 Theories for the Emergence of the RAE 
The arguments for why relative age matters can be loosely grouped in two categories. 
First, the RAE can emerge because the more advanced in a cohort get more resources in their 
 8
youth than the less advanced. For example, more advanced students and players in team 
sports may get more attention and advice from teachers and coaches. In schools, they may be 
allocated more responsibilities, e.g., they may act as auxiliary teachers or represent the class 
in various school committees. In team sports, they may get more easily selected in elite teams 
where coaches and other training facilities are better or they may get more playing time in 
more important positions (e.g., central midfield) which are more conducive for future 
development. This discrimination then amplifies the initial ability differences that may have 
been entirely due to relative age, rendering the differences persistent.   
Another class of explanations for the emergence of the RAE is based on psychology 
(see, e.g., Musch and Grondin, 2001, and Cobley et al., 2008). For example, being better than 
peers strengthen children’s self-confidence, self-esteem, and locus of control per se. 
Encouragement and attention by teachers and coaches strengthen further these attributes due 
to the Pygmalion effect (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). Similarly, additional responsibilities 
in school and playing in more important positions in team sports (and being, e.g., a captain of 
the team) should also boost self-esteem, self-confidence, and locus of control. According to 
the competence motivation theory (Harter, 1978), such perception of being talented and able 
to perform at a high level affects positively motivation and determination, yielding those 
children further success. This self-fulfilling mechanism works in the reverse direction, too, 
i.e., performing weaker than peers dilutes self-confidence, self-esteem, and locus of control, 
diluting motivation and determination, and so on. As a result, small differences in ability due 
to relative age are amplified over time to large, persistent differences in performance and 
outcomes.  
It is likely that both mechanisms are relevant for the emergence of the RAE, but it 
would be useful to know whether one of them is more important than the other. It is however 
empirically challenging to tell apart the effects of the theories because the emergence from the 
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same sources. Our contribution to this literature is that causal evidence of the RAE and 
heterogeneity in the RAE should at least provide some speculative indication of the 
underlying mechanism.  
 
2.3 Theoretical Background for the Competition and Gender Differences in the RAE 
The RAE has been documented to be more prevalent in more competitive 
environments in sports (see, e.g., Musch and Grondin, 2001, and Addona and Yates, 2010). 
Competition in professional sports, as in the marketplace, forces clubs and associations to 
seek measures to improve performance, e.g., search for early-age talents. For example, in low 
competition team sports any player gets to the team, whereas in highly competitive team 
sports highly performing players are prioritized and, in youth sports, performance is on 
average related to relative age. The more popular the sport in a country or a region, the more 
intense is the competition for the elite teams or national teams, and the stronger is the RAE.  
The RAE in politics could also be related to the intensity of political competition. If 
we assume that political parties behave like business corporations and sport clubs, electoral 
competition should force the parties to seek measures to enhance their electoral success (see 
e.g., De Paola and Scoppa 2011 and Galasso and Nannicini, 2011, for evidence). Even 
without party inference, electoral competition should eliminate weaker candidates. For 
example, in low competition political environments, virtually anyone can become a candidate 
or even elected whereas in highly competitive political environments, only those with the 
highest expected success probability will be selected as candidates and only the most 
attractive to voters will eventually be selected. Candidates’ valence to voters, political parties, 
and campaign financiers could be linked to some psychological traits (e.g., self-esteem, 
confidence and locus of control) that have been impacted by the RAE. Such psychological 
traits could also enhance candidates’ ability and willingness to engage in electoral 
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campaigning. The more important and competitive the election, the more the candidate 
selection, candidates’ valence and campaigning performance matters.   
The existence of gender differences in the RAE in sports, especially in football 
(soccer), are also extensively studied. Although the evidence (see, e.g., Helsen et al., 2005, 
Vincent and Glamser, 2006, Nakata and Samamoto, 2012, and Kirkendall, 2014) is somewhat 
inconclusive, the presence of the RAE in female athletes appears to be smaller than in male 
athletes.2 There is also some evidence of the gender-specific RAE in other areas than sports. 
Landersø et al. (2017), for example, find that higher relative school starting age reduces the 
probability of committing a crime at a young age and that the effect is significantly stronger 
for boys than girls, and Aune et al. (2018) find gender differences in the RAE in numeracy.  
Gender differences in the RAE have been rationalized by several factors. First, given 
that the emergence of the RAE has been linked to the intensity of competition, weaker level of 
competition among female athletes in many sports offers a logical explanation for the gender 
gap in the RAE in such sports (Musch and Grondin, 2001). Second, Baxter-Jones (1995) 
suggests that stronger RAE among male athletes is a result of the earlier average maturation 
of girls and higher variance of the maturity among boys. Vincent and Glamser (2006) argue 
that the effects of maturation differences on the gender gap in the RAE are amplified by 
psychological and sociocultural factors. Finally, gender-specific coping strategies and 
emotional response to various environmental factors in childhood and adolescence could be 
expected to create a gender gap in the RAE (Eschenbeck et al., 2007, Chaplin and Aldao, 
2013, and Aune et al. 2018). 
While these reasons for the emergence of the gender gap in the RAE are theoretical 
and mostly concern sports, they suggest that gender differences in the RAE in politics would 
not be implausible. For example, based on the aforementioned literature, we can speculate 
                                                 
2 Evidence of the existence of the RAE from the studies focusing on female football players (rather than on 
gender differences) is also somewhat ambiguous (see, e.g., Delorme et al. 2010, and Romann and Fuchslocher, 
2011), suggesting potential gender differences. 
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that gender differences in the RAE on early-life human capital might generate traits that are 
valuable in the political arena only for men. Early maturing females’ social identity might also 
be more easily linked to socially constructed and stereotyped definition of femininity that 
could discourage participation in politics just as in the case of sports. However, the purpose of 
our analysis is explorative rather than to explicitly test a particular hypothesis. We leave it to 
future studies to be more specific on testing the mechanisms at work. 
There could also be gender differences in response to political competition. Men have 
been documented to be more competitive than women on average (see Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2011, and Niederle, 2016, for surveys of the evidence). Gender differences in 
response to competition have been reported in the laboratory experiments in willingness to 
both enter into competition (see, e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) and exert effort while in 
a competition (see, e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003). The gender gap in competitiveness appears to 
be stronger in mixed-sex competition than in single-sex competition or in self-competition 
(see, e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003, Niederle et al., 2013, and Backus et al., 2016, and Apicella et 
al., 2017). The gender gap seems to emerge at an early age (see, e.g., Gneezy and Rustichini, 
2004, and Glätzle-Rützler and Sutter, 2014), and to exist in diverse societies (see, e.g., 
Gneezy et al., 2009, Apicella and Dreber, 2015, and Zhang, 2018). Gender differences in 
response to competition have also been documented outside the laboratories (see, e.g., Buser 
et al. 2014, Reuben et al., 2015, Backus et al., 2017, and Zhang, 2018). We can hence predict 
some gender differences in political competitiveness, especially given the mixed-sex nature of 
electoral competition. Therefore, if talented women (disproportionally) shy away from 
political competition or exert less effort in campaigning, and if competition enhances the role 
of RAE, we could observe a (stronger) RAE in males in more competitive political 
environments. That political competition would affect talented women disproportionally is 
plausible since able citizens have better outside options to a political career (see, e.g., Caselli 
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and Moreno, 2004 and Poutvaara and Takalo, 2007 for theory, and Brollo et al., 2013 for 
evidence). Furthermore, Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011) provide evidence also from Finnish 
parliamentary elections suggesting that women are more sensitive to the opportunity costs of 
entering to politics.  
Competition could also diminish a gender gap in the RAE. First, it is also plausible 
that untalented women shy away disproportionally from competition since competition in 
itself favors talent. Whether the outside option mechanism or direct competition mechanism 
dominates is an empirical question. Second, if the sports literature hypothesis that gender 
differences in the RAE are explained by the level of competition holds, we should observe a 
smaller gender gap in the RAE in more competitive political environments, especially in 
Finland where the participation of women in politics is high (see Section 3.2). Our paper 
contributes to this literature by providing evidence to test this depth of competition-
explanation for the gender gap in the RAE by analyzing both forces simultaneously.3 
A related explanation for heterogeneity in the RAE in politics in terms of competition 
and gender is that voters value competitive characteristics more in male politicians than 
female politicians. Political parties maximizing their electoral success should take such voter 
preferences into account already in candidate selection. Unfortunately, our analysis cannot 
distinguish whether candidates’ or voters’ preferences for competition matter more in politics. 
However, we find no gender differences on what candidate characteristics predict personal 
votes in the local elections sample that contains rich information on the candidates (results not 
reported). 
It is also conceivable that the RAE might vary across political parties. For example, 
Berggren et al. (2017) show that politicians on the right are on average better looking than 
politicians on the left, and suggested as an explanation that beautiful people are more likely to 
                                                 
3 For an attempt to evaluate this hypothesis by using observational data, see, e.g., Baker et al. (2009). 
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perceive the world as just place, and adopt hence conservative values. Similarly, we may 
think that if those born early perform better or are treated better in their youth than their 
relatively younger peers, they will also begin to treat the world as a more just place, and adopt 
more likely conservative values. We could thus observe the RAE more visibly among the 
politicians of the right-wing parties than of the left-wing parties.  
Alternatively, since party organization matters for candidate selection, it could also 
matter for the emergence of the RAE in politics. We will hence compare the candidates of the 
Centre Party of Finland to the candidates of other parties since the Centre Party has more 
centralized candidate selection and nomination procedures than the other parties (Meriläinen 
and Tukiainen, 2018). For example, a centralized process could lose information on candidate 
ability or valence, or lead to preferring policy alignment or party loyalty over such 
characteristics, which could imply that human capital accumulation benefits from the RAE 
would not show up as such candidates are not selected. Relatedly, Folke and Rickne (2016) 
argue that objective valuations of candidates become more common if the procedure is 
decentralized. A salient division in the Finnish politics also arises from distinctive agrarian 
roots of the Centre Party, whereas the other main parties are nowadays more urban.  
 
3. Data and Institutional Background 
3.1 The Finnish Education System  
Since experiences at school should be the main mechanism in explaining the potential 
existence of an RAE in politics, we review the Finnish education system here briefly. The 
compulsory basic education in Finland consists of nine years of comprehensive school, which 
begins during the calendar year a child turns seven.  
There are no tuition fees at any stage of education and, in addition, in comprehensive 
school all the materials, transportation and lunch are free as well. Virtually all children in 
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Finland complete basic education. For instance, according to the Finnish National Board of 
Education, only 0.1% of a cohort do not graduate from comprehensive school. At the end of 
ninth grade, each student who has passed all subjects receives a basic education certificate, 
which contains a numerical or verbal assessment in each subject. The certificate is used the 
main criteria in the selection process to the upper secondary schools where, according to the 
Finnish National Board of Education, roughly 90% of students continue after completing the 
compulsory basic education. Anyone who has completed an upper secondary school is 
eligible to apply to a university. Depending on the subject and university, students are chosen 
through an entrance exam and based on their matriculation examination.  
A few features make the Finnish education system conducive for the emergence of the 
RAE in other areas of human life. First, because of the schools starting rule, at the beginning 
of the first grade of the basic education, the oldest of a cohort can be almost one year older 
than the youngest of the cohort. Second, retention during basic education is uncommon. For 
instance, according to the Finnish National Board of Education, only 0.5 % of students were 
held back in comprehensive school annually during the years 2000-2007. This should 
guarantee that most adults have spent the same number of years in comprehensive school. 
Third, postponing school start or earlier enrollments to school are relatively rare. Only around 
2% percent of students in each cohort have delayed the start of school between the years 
1995-1999 (Kaila, 2017). Fourth, compulsory education extends to a relatively old age in 
Finland, so the initial large differences in the relative age have time to accumulate. Finally, 
according to the Finnish National Institute for Health and Welfare, almost all babies (99.6%) 
in Finland are born in hospitals where their date of birth is carefully documented.  
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3.2 The Finnish Political Institutions and Data 
We have data from two types of general elections for the representatives for the 
Finnish democratic institutions.4 Municipal elections are held to elect the municipal 
councilors. Although the number of municipalities has significantly reduced over the recent 
decades, at the beginning of 2016 there were still 313 municipalities in Finland and the 
median size was only roughly 6000 inhabitants. The larger the municipality the larger the 
number of councilors elected. However, the relationship between the municipality size and 
the elected councilors is concave, implying that competition for seats is more intense in larger 
municipalities. Voters of a municipal election consist of adult European Union citizens whose 
home address is in the municipality. Being a councilor of a municipality is not a paid job but 
the councilors only get small honorariums.  
 In the nation-wide parliamentary elections, the 200 members of the Finnish 
parliament are elected. The electorate consists of roughly 4.5 million adult Finnish citizens, 
divided into 13 electoral districts. Being a member of the parliament is a full-time job with a 
relatively high salary.  
Both elections are dominated by three large parties from the political left, center and 
right: The Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party of Finland, and the National Coalition 
Party, respectively. In total eight parties get seats in the parliament and these same are the 
eight largest parties in the local elections. 
Female representation both at the candidate and elected official level is high by the 
international standards although the majority of candidates and elected officials are males.   
Both municipal and parliamentary elections are held every four years, but not on the same 
year. Both elections use the open list proportional representation system using the D’Hondt 
seat allocation method. Voters have to place a preference vote for an individual candidate. 
                                                 
4 Besides these two elections the Finns participate for the elections for members of the European parliament and 
the election for the President of the Finland.  
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This system creates incentives to cultivate a personal vote and induces competition both 
within and between parties (Carey and Shugart 1995) making it a plausible case for the RAE 
to arise. 
We have access to a candidate level election data for 1996-2012 municipal elections 
and 1999-2007 parliamentary elections. These data are from the Finnish Ministry of Justice. 
During this period there was still substantial variation across parliamentary districts in 
political competition when measured, for example, by population per seat. Subsequent reform 
erased these regional differences. 
We describe these data in Table 1. There is a similar quite high about 40% share of 
female candidates in both types of elections. Also the age distribution of candidates is fairly 
similar in both elections. The parliamentary elections seem to be much more competitive in 
terms of the number of candidates, the number of votes and especially the much lower share 
of elected, even conditional on the smaller set of candidates. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on candidates. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Municipal elections 
Votes 198,120 61 149 0 11815 
Elected 198,121 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Female 198,121 0.387 0.487 0 1 
Age 198,120 46.7 12.6 18 95 
Parliamentary elections 
Votes 6,026 1368 2386 3 60563 
Elected 6,026 0.100 0.299 0 1 
Female 6,026 0.389 0.488 0 1 




4. Empirical Strategy and Results 
4.1 Identification Strategy and Implementation 
To evaluate whether or not an RAE exist in politics and whether or not the effect has a 
causal interpretation, we employ RDD. We compare the electoral performance of candidates 
that are of the same absolute age, and born in the same season, but were of different relative 
age among their cohort, e.g., when in school and in other children and youth activities using 
the 1st of January cut-off date. More specifically, we ask whether a candidate born on the 1st 
January of any given year has a higher probability to get elected (and to run for office) than a 
candidate born on the 31st of December of the previous year. These candidates have a 1 day 
absolute age difference but a 1 year relative age difference. Moreover, we study whether the 
the effect on the success probability of a January-born candidate becomes smaller the later he 
or she is born in a calendar year. We evaluate the different types of elections (municipal, 
parliamentary) separately, and also conduct the gender, party and competition analysis using 
separate samples. 
In RDD, we compare two candidates with different relative age but the same absolute 
age and same season of birth.  We estimate regression functions of the form 
 
(1) Yit = α + β•1{vit> 0} + f(vit) + εit, 
 
where Yit is the outcome of interest, in particular, whether the candidate gets elected. The 
forcing variable vit measures the distance from the cut-off located at the turn of the calendar 
year. To make the forcing variable equidistant on both sides of the cut-off, January 1 and 
December 31 get values of 0.5 and -0.5, respectively, and the other dates are assigned values 
accordingly. We also account for leap years.  
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In the right hand side of equation (1), 1{vit > 0} is an indicator function for being 
relatively old (born on the right side of the cut-off), and β is the coefficient of interest. If f(vit) 
is approximately correctly specified within a bandwidth, and there is no precise manipulation 
of the forcing variable (i.e., the density is smooth at the threshold), the other covariates should 
evolve smoothly at the boundary, and thus, β will be the causal estimate of the RAE. In this 
context, it is very likely that the treatment assignment is as-good-as-random close to the 
threshold, because parents cannot perfectly control the exact date of when giving their birth 
even if they attempted to do so. As is standard in RDD, imprecise manipulation of the birth 
date does not hinder identification. For example, even if some selected parents would aim to 
give birth early in the year, we would be able to identify the causal effect of interest, because 
they do not always succeed in that.  
As suggested, e.g., by Gelman and Imbens (2014), we execute the design using low-
order local polynomial specifications. Our implementation follows closely suggestions of 
Calonico et al. (2014 and 2016a). We employ the Mean Squared Error (MSE) optimal 
bandwidths provided by Calonico et al. (2016b) that improve on the existing MSE-optimal 
bandwidths by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (columns (1)-(4) of Tables 2 and 3) and 
Calonico et al. (2014), and also their Coverage Error Rate (CER) optimal bandwidths (column 
(5) of Tables 2 and 3). We also verify the robustness to alternative range of bandwidths 
(columns (1) and (2) in Tables 2 and 3). We conduct the RDD both with (somewhat outdated, 
see Calonico et al., 2014 and 2016a, and Hyytinen et al., 2018,) conventional local linear 
approach (columns (1) and (2) of Tables 2 and 3), but also with the more recent approach of 
bias correction and robust inference proposed by Calonico et al. (2014 and 2016a) (columns 
(3)-(5) of Tables and 3, referred to as the CCT-correction). We also report results where we 
fix the main and bias bandwidths to be the same following the advice in Calonico et al. 
(2016a) and Hyytinen et al. (2018) (column (4) of Tables 2 and 3). All local regressions use 
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the standard triangular kernel. We use local linear specification in the conventional approach, 
and in the CCT-correction we use local linear for the main effect estimation and local 
quadratic for the bias estimation. 
Note that the conventional local linear MSE-optimal coefficient is the optimal choice 
for the point estimate. However, for statistical inference, the confidence intervals based on the 
bias-corrected coefficient and associated robust inference by Calonico et al. (2014) are the 
most reliable due to their superior coverage properties. Nonetheless, we report in each column 
the respective point estimate and standard error, but it would be useful to look at the point 
estimate in column (2) and the confidence interval in column (3) for the most reliable overall 
picture. 
We cluster both the bandwidth selection and the statistical inference at the forcing 
variable level, that is, one day is one cluster. This clustering addresses two issues. First, same 
candidate can run many times creating the issue of within-candidate residual correlation. As 
the birth-date does not change, clustering at the forcing variable level addresses this issue. 
Second, the forcing variable is a discrete daily based measure in which case Lee and Card 
(2008) recommend clustering at the forcing variable level. Our results are more precise if we 
do not cluster (not reported). 
Typically RDD would identify an average treatment effect (ATE) at the thresholds. This 
local effect happens to be precisely the RAE of interest for us in the sense of relating to 
maximum relative age difference possible in this institution. One caveat is that if there is 
selection that children have been pushed to school earlier or later than their calendar year 
would indicate, we are identifying an intent-to-treat effect (ITT). An ITT is likely to be a 
lower bound of an ATE in this case due to contamination. However, in Finland the calendar 
year assignment to school cohorts is almost invariantly followed, and thus, in our case an ITT 
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is likely to be very close to an ATE. Dee and Sievertsen (2015) show using real school 
starting age data from Denmark that the ITT and ATE are in practice identical. 
 
4.2 RDD Main Results 
In Figures 1a-b we show the results graphically for the parliamentary elections for all 
candidates.5 Figure 1a is a global regression using all the data and 4th order polynomial 
specification (as is default in the rdplot STATA package), and Figure 1b is the local linear 
specification within the MSE-optimal bandwidth. The vertical axis shows the success 
probability and the horizontal axis describes the distance to the New Year cut-off (the 0-point) 
in days. Based on these figures, those born early in the year seem to have a higher success 
probability in elections. In other words, the RAE appears to exist in parliamentary politics.  
 
                                                 
5 Figures are plotted with the rdplot command in STATA by Calonico et al. (2015). For the bin sizes, we use the 























Table 2 displays the regression results for parliamentary elections. The coefficient for 
relative age is positive in all the reported regressions and statistically significant in three out 
of five specifications (one at 1%, one at 5% and one at 10% level). The effect is also very 
large in magnitude: The (smallest) MSE-optimal estimate (column (2)) implies that being 
born in January 1st instead of December 31st increase the probability of getting elected to the 
parliament by 6.9 percentage points (conditional on running for the parliament). This almost 
doubles the baseline probability given that in the data, 600 candidates are elected (200 per 
elections) and we have a total of 6026 candidate-election observations (see Table 1). The 
more flexible the specification (narrower bandwidth or higher the degree of polynomial) the 
larger the effect, showing that when we put more weight to observations where the relative 
age difference is the largest, we also get larger effects as expected. Overall, the regression 
results and the graphical results clearly document the existence of the RAE, and suggest a 
causal interpretation. 
 
Table 2. RAE for parliamentary election candidates. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimate 0.166*** 0.069 0.088 0.148** 0.107* 
95% CI [0.041;0.290] [-0.029;0.166] [-0.022;0.198] [0.020;0.275] [-0.009;0.223] 
Method Convent. local lin. Convent. local lin. CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction 
Bandwidth selector MSE*0.5 MSE MSE MSE CER 
Bandwidth(s) 22 43 43/75 43/43 32/75 
Effective N 750 1423 1423 1423 1065 
Notes: * Denotes statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and * at 1% level. For the CCT-correction, 
we report both the main bandwidth and the bias bandwidth. Both the bandwidth selection and statistical 
inference is clustered at the level of the forcing variable. 
 
In Table 3, we analyze RAE for local elections. We find no evidence of an RAE in that 
overall sample and the confidence intervals are quite narrow. Depending on the specification, 
we can rule out effects larger than between about 2-5 percentage points, which are quite small 
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effects given that baseline probabilities of getting elected in local elections are quite high 
(almost 30%, see Table 1). This null-result is robust across the various specifications. A 
possible candidate for explaining the difference between local and national elections is the 
intensity of competition. We turn to this and other types of heterogeneity in the effect in the 
next section. 
 
Table 3. RAE for local election candidates. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimate 0.017 0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.001 
95% CI [-0.013;0.047] [-0.021;0.024] [-0.027;0.026] [-0.022;0.040] [-0.027;0.030] 
Method Convent. local lin. Convent. local lin. CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction 
Bandwidth selector MSE*0.5 MSE MSE MSE CER 
Bandwidth(s) 24 47 47/78 47/47 35/78 
Effective N 24733 48231 48231 48231 35739 
Notes: * Denotes statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and * at 1% level. For the CCT-correction, 
we report both the main bandwidth and the bias bandwidth. Both the bandwidth selection and statistical 
inference is clustered at the level of the forcing variable. 
 
4.3 RDD Heterogeneity Results 
We analyze the heterogeneity of the effects in three dimensions, degree of competition, 
gender, and political party. 
Fist, we run the RDD separately on candidate samples with high or low competition. 
We measure competition for office at the parliamentary district level simply by calculating the 
population per available seat. This simple measure is attractive as it likely captures 
competition in the selection process for both candidacy and getting elected, and accounts for 
both between and within party competition.6 This measure varies between about 24,000 and 
28,000 inhabitants per available seat. We split the sample so that about half of the allocated 
                                                 
6 Typical measures of political competition (see, e.g., Galasso and Nannicini ,2011, and Cox et al., 2018) focus 
on between party electoral competition, and thus, do not provide a comprehensive picture of how competitive is 
the entire process of political selection. 
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seats are in both samples. Moreover, the high competition sample contains 7 out the 8 largest 
cities in Finland (and the 4 largest). As highly educated and otherwise more skilled citizens 
are concentrated on cities, this is likely to further intensify the competition in that sample. 
Second, we run the RDD separately on female and male candidate samples. This 
division based on gender is straightforward as it is based on election register information on 
gender rather than ,e.g., on surveyed gender identity.  
Third, we divide the candidate sample along the party differences. There are two natural 
divisions in the Finnish context. The first division is between left- and right-wing parties. 
Similar mechanisms that lead candidates on the right to be better looking (see Berggren et al., 
2017) could lead to relatively more right-wing candidates born early in the year. However, we 
find no difference between the Social Democratic and the National Coalitional Party with 
both exhibiting almost identical RAE in magnitude (see Table A1 in the Online Appendix). In 
contrast, we compare the Centre Party of Finland to the other parties. As explained in Section 
2.3, the Centre Party has idiosyncratic agrarian roots, and more centralized candidate selection 
and nomination procedures than the other parties (Meriläinen and Tukiainen, 2018).  
The heterogeneity results for the parliamentary elections are presented in Table 4. The 
specification corresponds to one in column (3) of Table 2 (results are robust to alternative 
specifications). We find large and statistically significant (at 1% level) effects for the high 
competition and male samples, and non-significant negative coefficients for the low 
competition and female samples. The results for males are also statistically significantly (at 
5% level) different from the female results as are the high completion results from the low 
competition ones (at 1% level) (so not only different from zero). These results provide strong 
evidence of the existence of an RAE being dependent on political competition and gender.  
Moreover, we find some evidence of heterogeneity across the parties. The coefficient 
for the Centre Party is negative and non-significant, whereas the coefficient for the other 
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parties is positive and significant at 10% level. However, the difference between these two 
estimates is not statistically significant mainly due to the imprecise Centre Party estimate for 
which the sample is small. A speculative interpretation is that a decentralized candidate 
placement favors those advantaged by early-year birth as explained in Section 2.3.  
 
Table 4. Heterogeneity in RAE for parliamentary election candidates. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimate 0.240*** -0.081 0.184*** -0.042 -0.126 0.119* 
95% CI [0.092;0.378] [-0.212;0.051] [0.056;0.312] [-0.190;0.106] [-0.539;0.287] [-0.002;0.240] 
Method CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction 
Bandwidth selector MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
Bandwidth(s) 35/64 65/96 35/67 70/108 61/88 40/69 
Effective N 596 999 699 891 211 1172 
Sample High competition Low competition Male Female Centre party Other parties 
Notes: * Denotes statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and * at 1% level. For the CCT-correction, 
we report both the main bandwidth and the bias bandwidth. Both the bandwidth selection and statistical 
inference is clustered at the level of the forcing variable. 
 
To understand further the heterogeneity in the RAE we repeated the analysis for local 
elections. In the case of local elections, high competition is defined as municipalities with 
population larger than the 75th percentile of 34,388. In Table 5, the coefficients in all the 
subsamples indicate quite precisely (with the exception on the smaller Centre Party subsample 
which is more imprecise) estimated zero effect. Given the parliamentary election results the 
absence of a competition effect in local elections is not surprising, as the level of competition 
even in the most competitive municipality (about 6,650 inhabitants per available seat) is much 
lower than in the parliamentary district with the least competition. 
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Table 5. Heterogeneity in RAE for local election candidates. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimate 0.003 -0.001 -0.009 0.015 0.049 -0.006 
95% CI [-0.037;0.044] [-0.027;0.025] [-0.050;0.032] [-0.013;0.043] [-0.011;0.110] [-0.033;0.020] 
Method CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction CCT-correction 
Bandwidth selector MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE MSE 
Bandwidth(s) 54/82 74/113 48/75 65/104 36/67 68/110 
Effective N 14016 57033 30082 26062 8034 54530 
Sample High competition Low competition Male Female Centre party Other parties 
Notes: * Denotes statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and * at 1% level. For the CCT-correction, 
we report both the main bandwidth and the bias bandwidth. Both the bandwidth selection and statistical 
inference is clustered at the level of the forcing variable. 
 
Finally, we split the parliamentary election samples further to analyze how 
competition, gender and party interact. These results are reported in Tables A2 and A3 in the 
Online Appendix. The results indicate further that the RAE may be more nuanced that what is 
commonly thought: We find evidence of an RAE only in the case of males that are competing 
for parliamentary seats in the most competitive parliamentary districts, but we find no 
evidence otherwise. For example, the effect is not present for males in low competition 
districts nor for females in high competition districts. Moreover, the RAE fails to exist among 
the Centre Party candidates, even among males in the high competition environments.    
 
4.4 RDD Results on Selection for Candidacy 
To understand to what extent the RAE is present in candidate selection stage we analyze 
the RAE on candidacy. Here we do not observe the set of all potential candidates, but only the 
actual candidates. Thus, we conduct McCrary (2008) density estimation. The object here is 
not to seek for manipulation that would invalidate the design, but rather to estimate a real 
effect if interest, that is, the RAE on becoming a candidate in parliamentary elections. 
We focus the analysis on the parliamentary candidates to see if the candidate selection 
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4.5 RDD Robustness and Validity Tests 
For the sake of brevity, we report the robustness and validity checks only for the 
parliamentary election analysis, because that is the only sample where we claim to have found 
a positive effect. Similar analysis for the local elections gives no reasons to doubt the validity 
and robustness of the zero effects in that sample (not reported). 
Hyytinen et al. (2018) argue that the placebo cutoff tests are particularly useful for 
specification testing as opposed to validity testing (see also Matakos et al. 2018). Therefore, 
to test the appropriateness of applied specifications, in Figures 3a-3d, we artificially move the 
cut-off to placebo locations by the amount of days denoted in the x-axis, and report the 
coefficient and the associated 95% confidence interval estimated for each placebo location. 
We use here the specification in column (3) of Table 2 and all the specifications used in Table 
4. 
If our estimation specification is flexible enough (and not too flexible) and the design is 
valid, zero effect should be within the 95% confidence interval in (about) 95% of the placebo 
locations. Overall, the figures are fairly comforting, even if not always perfect. In all figures, 
most of the placebo estimates are insignificant indicating that the specification (CCT-
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  5. Conclusions 
We study whether the RAE can be given a causal interpretation and whether and how it 
varies with gender, the intensity of competition, and political party by using Finnish data from 
politics. Our results suggest that the RAE in politics is not driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity nor seasonal effects but is created by the artificial division of people into 
different age groups. We find that the RAE is only a concern for male politicians in 
competitive political environments. We also document that the lack of the RAE in female 
politicians, in municipal elections, and among the politicians of the Centre Party are possibly 
driven by the under-representation of early-born candidates in those groups.  
Our findings regarding gender and competition corroborate the previous literature on 
the RAE in sports suggesting gender differences in the RAE, and conduciveness of 
competitive pressure for the emergence of the RAE. However, our findings suggest that the 
documented gender gap in the RAE might not be driven (solely) by the differences in paces of 
maturation of boys and girls, in roles of physical requirements and in depths of competition of 
female and male sports as speculated in the literature.   
Rather, we conjecture that gender differences in the RAE could arise either from gender 
differences in the RAE on human capital accumulation such as self-confidence or from gender 
differences in preferences for and responses to competition. Substantial evidence (see surveys 
by Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011, and Niederle, 2016) suggests that women shy away from 
competition whereas men embrace it. Moreover, men typically perform better in more 
competitive environments. The gender gap in competitiveness also seems to higher in mixed-
sex competition such as politics. Finally, the adverse effects of performing badly in 
competitive environments seem to be larger for men than women. For example, Eliason and 
Storre (2009) report large negative health effects for men due to job loss but these effects are 
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absent for women. As our ambition is more explorative, isolating the exact mechanism behind 
the gender heterogeneity in the RAE is, however, a topic for further research.  
Our results combined with the laboratory evidence from Niederle et al. (2013) allow for 
speculation that institutional reforms (e.g., quota-style affirmative actions) aiming at reducing 
the gender gap in political representation, or more generally, in competitiveness might also 
reduce the gender gap in the RAE.  
Our findings can also be seen to provide suggestive evidence that the RAE is driven by 
the human capital accumulation resulting from in particular the males benefiting from being 
able to successfully compete with their peers from early on in life. To fight against such 
persistent inequalities created by the artificial rules imposed by the society, educational 
systems could consider remedies to the RAE adopted by some advanced sport leagues and 
teams, such as bio-banding, i.e., grouping young based on attributes associated with growth 
and maturation, rather than on chronological age (see, e.g., Cumming et al., 2017). At least, 
teachers of young children should begin to pay careful attention to their students’ birth dates, 
especially when evaluating student performance. 7  
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